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EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF RESTRICTIVE STATE ABORTION
LAWS: STATES CAN ABORT PLANS TO ABORT AT

HOME BUT NOT ABROAD

The question of a state's authority to legislate abortion extraterritorially may appear largely academic because of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade, in which the Court prohibited states
from restricting abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy.' At first
glance, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey' appears to remove further the issue of extraterritorial abortion
legislation from the states because the decision purportedly reaffirmed
Roe. 3 The Casey decision, however, does not preclude returning the
abortion issue to the states. An extremely tenuous coalition of justices
reaffirmed Roe, while a united group of dissenters argued that the
Supreme Court should defer resolution of the abortion issue to state legislatures.4 Furthermore, Casey's "undue burden" standard allows states
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. The Supreme Court's recent, and sharply divided decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), appears to uphold Roe. In Casey, the Court reaffirmed a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, but held that the state may regulate abortion if the regulation does not
constitute an "undue burden" on the woman's constitutional right. Id. at 2820 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J., joint opinion). The majority argued that overturning Roe would significantly
undermine the legitimacy of the Court. Id. at 2816 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J., joint
opinion joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.).
4. Casey's reaffirmation of Roe is not as solid as the Court suggests. Fourjustices flatly stated
that the Court should overturn Roe. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("[W]e believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should
be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.")
(joined by Scalia, White, and Thomas, J.J.). Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stressed that, because
he might resign soon from the court, the future of Roe may hinge on the vote of the next appointed
Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Many commentators argue that
the Court should overturn Roe and return the abortion issue to the states. Howard Holme & Craig
A. Umbaugh, Abortion in Colorado: If Roe v. Wade is Reversed, 19 COLO. LAW. 807 (1990) (noting

that several justices indicated the Court could possibly overturn Roe in the near future). Although
commentators agree that the Supreme Court will continue to modify the Roe decision, they differ
over the form of the modification. See Clarke D. Forsythe, A Legal Strategy to Overturn Roe v.
Wade After Webster; Some Lessons from Lincoln, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 520, 535 (1991) (arguing that incrementally overturning Roe is politically more astute than totally reversing it); Daniel A.
Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: JudicialExperience with the 1980s "Reasonableness Test, " 76 VA. L. REv.519, 520 (1990) (arguing that rather than overturning Roe, the Court
should adopt a compromise position allowing "reasonable" abortion regulation); Arnold H. Loewy,
Why Roe v. Wade Should be Overruled, 67 N.C. L. REv. 939, 941 (1989) (arguing that the Court
should overturn Roe because it has no "legitimate source" of constitutional support); Ruth Bader
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significant latitude in restricting abortion, and the decision does not address extraterritoriality.' In the wake of the Casey decision, courts

throughout the nation will have to confront the question of the legality of
state-restrictive abortion laws. 6 The post-Casey abortion landscape will
largely resemble the pre-Roe landscape: a patchwork of states either le-

galizing or significantly restricting abortion, with women traveling interstate to obtain abortions.7
This Note examines the power of states to enact extraterritorial criminal abortion laws. Previous attempts to address this issue have failed to
recognize any limits on a state's authority to legislate restrictive abortion
laws. This Note proposes a framework for addressing the legality of extraterritorial state legislation and for imposing restrictions on state extra-

territorial legislative authority. Section I examines the timeliness of
issues relating to extraterritorial criminal abortion legislation. Section II
discusses possible sources for a state's authority to legislate beyond its
borders, focusing on the Model Penal Code's discussion of extraterritoriality and the traditional international law bases for criminal jurisdiction.
Section III addresses the applicability of international law principles to
the separate states of the United States. Section IV applies the judicially
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv.
375, 386 (1985) (arguing that the Court incorrectly based Roe on the right to privacy and should
have protected a woman's right to an abortion under the rubric of sex discrimination).
5. If Casey's "undue burden" standard stands, the Court will remain involved in the issue of
abortion. The Court ultimately will face the task of determining which state regulations unduly
burden a woman's right to obtain an abortion. Tamar Lewin, States Expected to Enforce Abortion
Restrictions, N.Y. TiMEs, July 1, 1992, at A8. The central question of this Note, however, will still
be at issue: whether women can travel to another state to avoid particular abortion regulations and
whether a state has the power, through its criminal jurisdiction, to prevent the circumvention of its
laws. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Casey, Justice Blackmun recognized that the Court
has not yet addressed the legality of extraterritorial state abortion laws. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854
n.12. Blackmun argued that the Court will ultimately have to decide this issue even if Roe is overturned and the abortion issue returns to the states. Id.
6. The Casey decision did not address the legality of extraterritorial abortion laws. See supra
note 5. The Court, therefore, did not preclude states from enacting state-restrictive abortion legislation. This Note presumes that states through legislation will attempt to prevent pregnant women
from obtaining abortions in other states. Until the Supreme Court affirmatively resolves the issue,
lower courts will bear the burden of assessing the legality of such state-restrictive abortion laws.
7. See A Group Flight to Los Angeles to Get a Quick Abortion, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 17, 1972, at
28. The article discussed a weekly charter flight program from Dallas to Los Angeles, which allowed a women to purchase a 24-hour package combination of airfare and an abortion for $346. Id.
While indigent women cannot afford such an expensive option, some women, who can afford the
flight, will travel to other states to terminate their pregnancies.

1992]

EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF STATE ABORTION LAWS

1207

recognized restrictions on a state's power to legislate extraterritorially to
the specific issue of extraterritorial criminal abortion legislation.
I.

THE PRE-ROE AND POST-CASEY ABORTION LANDSCAPES

The movement toward less restrictive abortion legislation began in the
late 1950s.' Prior to 1970, however, states permitted abortions only in

cases involving rape, incest, birth defects, or when carrying the child to
term would threaten the mother's life.9 In 1970, New York became one

of the first states' ° to legalize abortion." The New York legislature enacted a statute which allowed a woman to choose an abortion on demand
during the first twenty-four weeks of her pregnancy.' 2 Hawaii, Alaska

and Washington also repealed criminal statutes 3 prohibiting abortion.' 4
8. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 35-45 (1990) (discussing
the changes in the medical profession's views on abortion and reasoning that the changing social and
economic conditions for women are contributing factors prompting increased efforts to liberalize
state abortion statutes). See also JULES SALTMAN & STANLEY ZIMERING, ABORTION TODAY 69, 70
(1973).
9. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 42. In 1959, the American Law Institute revised the Model Penal
Code to include exceptions to the criminal prohibition of abortion in cases involving rape, incest, or
birth defects, or cases where the birth of the child threatened the mother's life. Id. at 36. These
provisions of the Model Penal Code were widely followed by state legislatures seeking to reform
restrictive anti-abortion statutes.
See also Roy Lucas, Laws of the UnitedStates, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 127, 13035 (Robert E. Hall ed., 1970) (outlining the provisions of liberalized abortion laws in several states).
10. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 46. Hawaii was the first state to legalize abortion. Id. at 47. The
Hawaii statute legalized all abortions performed within the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. Id. For a
comprehensive study of the enactment of Hawaii's liberalized abortion legislation, see PATRICIA G.
STEINHOFF & MILTON DIAMOND, ABORTION POLITIcS: THE HAWAII EXPERIENCE (1977). For a
general history of abortion in the United States, see JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION INAMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978).
11. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 47.
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (Consol. 1970).
13. B. James George, Jr., Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, in
ABORTION AND THE LAW 1, 5-16 (David T. Smith ed., 1967). State criminal abortion statutes fall
within five main groups: (1) statutes penalizing abortion; (2) statutes prohibiting killing an unborn
quick child; (3) statutes penalizing death of the pregnant woman resulting from abortion; (4) statutes
penalizing the woman who seeks an abortion; and (5) statutes penalizing activity which facilitates
performance of abortions. Id.
14. HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (1985); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 12, § 40.060-40.140
(1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.060 (West 1970).
The State of Washington required a woman to satisfy several requirements before obtaining legal
abortion. A doctor could only perform an abortion on a woman "not quick with child" and within
four months of conception. Id. In addition, the law required the woman to consent or provide
consent from her husband or legal guardian if she was under 18. Moreover, a woman was required
to live in the state for at least 90 days before she was eligible to obtain an abortion in an accredited
hospital. Id. § 9.02.070. Interestingly, the Washington statute required ratification at a general
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The proximity of this reform legislation gave rise to the belief that states

across the country would follow suit and liberalize their criminal abortion laws.15 Yet, an in-depth analysis of the three-year period between
the abolition of several states' restrictive abortion laws, and the Supreme

Court's decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973, reveals a different story.16
New York State's experience illustrates the political ramifications of
legalized abortion. In 1970, by only one vote, the New York Assembly

passed legislation legalizing abortion.7. In the two years following the
reform, New York anti-abortion forces mobilized enormous support and

exerted intense political pressure on state legislators. 8 In 1972, the New
York Assembly repealed the 1970 law by passing a new bill that permitted abortion only when it was necessary to save the life of the mother.1 9
Admist the controversy, Governor Nelson Rockefeller vetoed the new

bill, thus leaving New York's liberalized abortion law intact.20
Across the nation, similar controversies concerning abortion legislation developed.21 By 1972, lawmakers in many states who publicly en-

dorsed pro-abortion positions experienced political ramifications. 22
Legislators favoring legalized abortion were inundated with opposition
letters, targeted in negative advertising campaigns,2 3 and voted out of
election to become effective. Id. § 9.02.090. Washington voters ratified the referendum in the November 3, 1970 general election. See generally SALTMAN & ZIMERING, supra note 8, at 70 (discussing abortion laws in the United States immediately prior to Roe).
15. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 49 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW (1987)).
16. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 49-51 (questioning the belief that the trend toward legal abortion
would have persisted, even if the Court had declined to provide for national legalized abortion, and
noting that the movement for general repeal of anti-abortion laws was not "overwhelmingly

victorious").
17. Id. at 48. When it appeared that the anti-abortion forces had defeated passage of the liber-

alized abortion law by a single vote, Assemblyman George M. Michaels switched his vote at the last
minute, deciding to support the new law. Paying the price for his change of heart, he was not reelected to the New York Assembly. Id. at 47-49. See also William E. Farrell, Women Protesting
EasierAbortions Storm Assembly and Halt Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1972, at 94.
18. Fred C. Shapiro, "Right to Life" has a Message for New York State Legislators, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1972, § 6 (magazine), at 10, 34.
19. William E. Farrell, Assembly Passes Bill to Repeal Liberalized Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 1972, at Al.
20. William E. Farrell, Governor Vetoes Abortion Repeal as Not Justified, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1972, at Al.
21. AntiabortionForces Demonstratea Growing Influence in State LegislaturesAcross the Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1972, at 21.

22. Id. Michigan Representative Richard J. Allen stated: "You can favor financial support for
nonpublic schools and everything else, but you're done if you cross over their line on abortion." Id.
23. Id. An Illinois anti-abortion group attacked Illinois Representative Rayson, a long-time
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office. 4 Anti-abortion backlash both precluded further change in states
which had already passed less restrictive abortion laws and prevented the
enactment of more permissive abortion laws in other states.2 5

In Connecticut, the conflict over abortion created a power struggle between the federal judiciary and the Connecticut legislature.2 6 In 1972, a
federal district court in Hartford found Connecticut's restrictive abortion
law unconstitutional.2 7 Notwithstanding this ruling, the Connecticut
state legislature re-enacted essentially the same restrictive abortion law
by revising only the statute's preamble.28
Shortly before the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,29 state legisla-

tures experimented with ways to restrict access to abortions. Some
states, for example, imposed residency requirements in response to fears

among legislatures that their jurisdictions would turn into "abortion

mills."3 Statistics illustrated that in the first five months following the
enactment of legislation legalizing abortion, doctors performed ten percent of all abortions on nonresidents.3 ' Moreover, in the first two years
of legal abortion in New York, doctors conducted slightly over fifty percent of abortions on out-of-state residents.3 2
States also experimented with other methods of restricting access to
abortion rights advocate. The anti-abortion advocates flooded Rayson's district with leaflets picturing aborted fetuses in a bucket. d.
24. Id. For example, in 1970, Michigan residents refused to re-elect N. Lorraine Beebe, a
leader in the movement for abortion reform and the state's only woman state senator. When 22year-old David Plawecki defeated Beebe, he became the youngest state senator in the country. Id.
See also supra note 16.
25. Antiabortion ForcesDemonstratea Growing Influence in State LegislaturesAcross the Country, N.Y. TiMEs, June 28, 1972, at 21.
26. Lawrence Fellows, Connecticut Ban on Abortion Gains, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1972, at Al.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
30. Lucas, supra note 9, at 132. Lucas only discussed residency requirements in North Carolina, Georgia, and Colorado. None of these states provided for an abortion on demand. Interestingly, Hawaii and Washington, which both legalized abortion on demand, included residency
requirements. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 47. See also supra note 14.

In 1973, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Supreme Court struck down residency requirements. In Doe, the Court held that Georgia's residency requirement violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 200. See also Lucas, supra note 9, at 132; TRIBE,
supra note 8, at 47 (noting that Hawaii's repeal measure contained a residency requirement to pacify
fears that the state may eventually become an "abortion mill").
31. STEINHOFF & DIAMOND, supra note 10, at 1801. This figure dropped dramatically after
New York and Washington repealed their abortion laws. Six months after New York legalized
abortion, doctors in Hawaii performed only one percent of abortions on out-of-state women. M.
32. Abortions for Out-of-Staters Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10. 1972, at 49. In the first year of
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abortions. Connecticut, for example, not only imposed criminal liability
on physicians for performing abortions,3 3 but also criminalized advertis-

ing the ability to conduct abortions or the sale of medicines or instruments necessary to perform abortions.34 Given Connecticut's prohibition
on abortion, the legislatures most likely intended to deter the solicitation
of women who would consider leaving the state to obtain an abortion.
The Court's decision in Roe effectively nullified the politically con-

servative movement against supporters of legalized abortion and significantly diminished states' efforts to extend their criminal codes to restrict
the number of situations in which a woman could seek an abortion.35
Declaring that the right to have an abortion during the first trimester of a
pregnancy constitutes a fundamental right,36 the Supreme Court preempted the "laboratory of the states" 37 at a time when the isolating ef-

fects of restrictive abortion laws confronted states retaining criminal
abortion statutes. In the wake of Roe, the question of whether a state

which outlaws abortion could prevent its own citizens from obtaining an
abortion in another state remained unresolved. In the post-Casey era,
the "laboratory of the states" must address the question of state extrater-

ritorial criminal abortion legislation.38 Missouri, for example, which

legalized abortion in New York, non-resident women received 46.5% of all abortions. During the
second year of legal abortion, out-of-state women accounted for 54.4% of all abortions. Id.
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-30, 53-31 (repealed 1990).
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a (repealed 1990). The Connecticut legislature passed this
addition to the state's abortion laws on May 23, 1972. See supra note 26.
35. This is not to suggest that the anti-abortion movement died after the Roe decision. Based
on Roe, the anti-abortion forces could no longer affect the legal status of abortion on the state level,
absent a compelling state interest. However, anti-abortion groups, such as Operation Rescue, still
actively campaign to overturn Roe. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted sub nom., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S.Ct. 1070 (1991).
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
37. Justice O'Connor referred to the "laboratory of the states" in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The "laboratory of the
states," which imagines an environment of state experimentation with legal and constitutional issues,
reflects the Supreme Court's preference to give states the opportunity to produce suitable solutions
to legal issues. The Court will only intervene and address the issue when the states fail to adopt
consistent resolutions. See Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to
Die" in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REv. 1253 (1991).
38. The European Community recently faced the extraterritorial abortion legislation issue in a
widely publicized incident in Ireland. Although Ireland prohibits abortion, England permits the
procedure during the first 24 weeks of a woman's pregnancy. Ireland's Attorney General barred a
14 year-old rape victim from traveling to England for an abortion. William E. Schmidt, Girl, 14,
Raped and Pregnant,Is Caught in Web ofIrish Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at A 1.The Ireland
Supreme Court allowed the girl to travel to England to obtain an abortion. Life Before Roe v. Wade,
WASH. PoST, Mar. 2, 1992, at A16.
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produced the restrictive abortion legislation upheld in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,3 9 will probably not sit idle while pregnant women cross the Mississippi River to visit Illinois abortion cinics. 4
II.

A.

STATES' AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE EXTRATERRITORIALLY

The Model Penal Code's Presumption of State Extraterritorial
Authority

In 1956, the drafters of the Model Penal Code, members of the American Law Institute, introduced a codification of common law criminal jurisdiction for discussion at the Institute's annual meeting.4 1 In large
part, the drafters followed the main tenet of common law criminal juris42
diction-territoriality.
The doctrine of territoriality constitutes one of the oldest elements of
39. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Webster, the Court upheld a Missouri statute that prohibited state
employees and facilities from performing nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 507. The Court also
upheld the statute's requirement that doctors perform viability testing on fetuses of 20 or more
weeks. Id. at 519. For an excellent discussion of the Webster decision, see Walter Dellinger & Gene
B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreatfrom Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
83 (1989).
40. The Missouri state legislature is already rallying support for further abortion restrictions.
Recently, a House Committee defeated a bill which would have imposed criminal liability upon
doctors who perform any abortions, except to save the life of the mother. The bill failed to emerge
from the committee by only one vote. David Aguillard, Missouri Abortion Ban Blocked, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al.
41. 22 A.L.I. Proc. 95, 96 (1956). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1956) [hereinafter Draft]. Section 1.03(1), as finally adopted, states as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a person may be convicted under the law
of this State of an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another for
which he is legally accountable if:
(a) either the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is such an
element occurs within this State; or
(b) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute an attempt to commit an offense within the State; or
(c) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and an overt act in furtherance of
such conspiracy occurs within the State; or
(d) conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an
attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction that also is
an offense under the law of this State; or
(e) the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law of this
State with respect to domicile, residence or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction
in the State; or
(f) the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside
the State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State
and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (rev. commentaries 1985).
42. 22 A.L.I. Proc. 96 (1956).
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American and English criminal law.43 The principle grants a state the

authority to punish crimes committed within its territorial limits, but
prohibits a state from controlling conduct that occurs outside its bor-

ders. 4 The territoriality doctrine derived from the notion that crimes
constituted local affairs,45 from practical concerns with regard to evidentiary issues,46 and from the need to preserve fairness for defendants.47
reflects the
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by a local jury
48
principles.
fundamental
same
these
of
root
constitutional
The Model Penal Code drafters, however, recognized the underlying

difficulty with codifying the doctrine of strict territoriality to determine
jurisdiction.49 Specifically, the drafters recognized that a state employing
the strict-territoriality principle could not exercise jurisdiction over multistate crimes or large criminal conspiracies.50 To remedy this jurisdictional deficiency, the drafters departed from the common law in several

respects.5 1 Section 1.03(1)(f),

52 which

authorizes states to reach conduct

43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt., at 36 (rev. commentaries 1985). See generally Robert A.
Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 44 (1974)
(discussing the territorial doctrine); Daniel L. Rotenberg, ExtraterritorialLegislative Jurisdiction
and the State CriminalLaw, 38 TEX. L. REv. 763 (1960) (same).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt., at 36 (rev. commentaries 1985).
45. Id. at 37.
46. Leflar, supra note 43, at 47 (discussing the numerous justifications for the territoriality
principle).
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Leflar, supra note 43, at 47.
49. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 3-4.
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt., at 38 (rev. commentaries 1985) ("[A]ncient common law
found difficulty in seeing that a piece of mischief was triable anywhere if its component parts were
divided between two jurisdictions.") (quoting Glanville Williams, Venue and the Ambit of Criminal
Law, 81 L.Q. REv. 276, 526 (1965)). Under the strict territoriality principle, for a state to obtain
jurisdiction, the perpetrator must have committed all the elements of a crime within the state seeking
to punish the conduct. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt., at 38-39. Faced with increasing interstate
criminal conduct, states enacted statutes creating jurisdiction over offenses committed at least partly
outside the state. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 3. The drafters of the Model Penal Code
codified legislative extensions of the territoriality principle. Id. See also Rotenberg, supra note 43,
at 765 (discussing factors of American society that led states to legislatively extend their criminal
jurisdiction, particularly "[t]he obvious conclusion that contemporary American society lends itself
well to extraterritorial crime").
51. 22 A.L.I. Proc. 96 (1956). The Model Penal Code extended the common law territoriality
principle in three ways. First, the drafters allowed states to punish conduct beyond the states borders which would constitute an attempt to commit the crime, if attempted within the state. Id. See
Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03(l)(b). Judge Cardozo established the "attempt" extension in People v.
Werblow, 148 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1925). In Werblow, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
indictment of three brothers for grand larceny by false pretenses. The defendants conspired to defraud a New York bank's London branch. Id. at 788. The brothers committed no elements of the
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occurring entirely outside the state, represents the most significant divergence from common law. 3 A state asserting jurisdiction under section
1.03(l)(f) must fulfill two conditions: (1) the state must have a statute
expressly prohibiting the conduct outside the state; and (2) the criminal
conduct must bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
54

interest.

The drafters intended section 1.03(1)(f) to enable states to protect
their interests. 5 As an extension of the territoriality principle, section
1.03(1)(f) raised questions concerning authority and constitutionality.56
Members of the American Law Institute intensely debated these issues
when the drafters introduced section 1.03(1)(f). 57 Two main points
emerged from their discussion and from a careful reading of the draft
comment which accompanied the original draft of section 1.03.
First, although the drafters anticipated constitutional conflicts, they
expressly refused to articulate any constitutional authority for a state
crime in New York. Id. at 791. Creating the "attempt" extension and finding jurisdiction, Cardozo
stated: "[A] crime is not committed, either wholly or partly in this state, unless the act within this
state is so related to the crime that if nothing more had followed, it would amount to an attempt."
Id. at 788. Concluding that the "attempt" standard was satisfied, the Court upheld the conviction.
Id.
Second, the drafters provided authority to prohibit extra-state conspiracies to commit an offense
within the state, as long as an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within the state. 22 A.L.I.
Proc. 96 (1956). See Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03(l)(c).
Finally, the drafters believed that states should be able to reach conduct wholly outside the state
that hurts a state interest. 22 A.L.I. Proc. 96 (1956). See Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03(l)(c). For
discussion of the third extension of the territoriality principle, see infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
The drafters intended that the extensions would give a state greater authority to protect its interests and the interests of its citizens. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt., at 40 (rev. commentaries
1985).
52. The drafters originally codified this section at § 1.03(l)(d). See Draft, supra note 41,
§ 1.03(l)(d). After numerous revisions to § 1.03, paragraph (d) became paragraph (f)in the final
version of the Model Penal Code. Hereinafter, this Note will refer to this section as § 1.03(l)(f) or
(1)(f).
See supra note 41 for the text of § 1.03(1)().
53. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12 (including a provision enabling state extraterritorial
authority because the drafters anticipated that a state might have a "sufficient interest to punish for
"conduct outside the state which is not otherwise provided for in the draft").
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (l)(f) (rev. commentaries 1985). In addition, before a state
can exert jurisdiction, the criminal actor must know or should know the conduct affects the legitimate state interest. See supra note 41.
55. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12. See supra note 53.
56. A.L.I. Proc. 96 (1956).
57. Id. at 96-115.
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The drafters believed that courts

should address constitutional issues when examining the validity of a specific statute which creates extraterritorial jurisdiction under section

1.03(1)(f).

9

This belief reflects the drafters' presumption that the consti-

tutionality of extraterritorial statutes depends on the type of conduct pro-

hibited by the legislation.'

The question of a state's actual constitutional

authority to enact a statute proscribing conduct outside the state's territorial boundaries did not concern the drafters. 6 1 For example, a state

statute criminalizing charitable contributions to religious organizations
located in another state raises constitutional issues. Under the drafter's
view, the constitutional problems created by this statute stem from a conflict with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, rather than from
the state's authority to enact the statute at all. 62 The drafters of the
Model Penal Code simply presumed states' authority to legislate
extraterritorially.6 3
Second, the significance of the presumption of state extraterritorial
power lies in the drafters' justification for departing from the common
law. To support their presumption that a state has the authority to legislate beyond its borders, the drafters cited a Civil War case involving

voter fraud.'

In State ex rel. Chandlerv. Main ,65 a candidate for public

office challenged a Wisconsin statute that allowed soldiers to vote by ab-

sentee ballot, but penalized illegal voting by such soldiers. 66 The candi58. Id. at 97 (explaining that a state statute falling within § 1.03(l)(f) "has to run the constitutional gauntlet on its own").
59. Id. at 96.
60. Id. at 95-115. The drafters did not discuss the constitutionality of § 1.03(l)(f), except in
connection with the possible content of a state statute which falls within § 1.03(l)(f). See id. (statement of Professor Wechster) ("But [§ 1.03(l)(f)] has no specific content as it stands. It doesn't
legitimize anything.... It deliberately interposes no bar, relying on the constitutional bar.").
61. Id.
62. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that this clause is applicable to the states. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 246 (1940) (holding the free exercise clause applicable to the states); Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding the establishment clause applicable to the states).
63. The drafters' belief that the detailing of constitutional arguments pertaining to § 1.03(l)(f)
was unnecessary supports the notion that the drafters presumed constitutionality. See 22 A.L.I.
Proc. 98 (1956). The argument that they assumed the section was constitutional is strengthened
further given that the drafters intentionally moved beyond the common law on this point. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text.
64. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12. See also 22 A.L.I. Proc. 97 (1956).
65. 16 Wis. 398 (1863).
66. Id.

1992]

EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF STATE ABORTION LAWS

1215

date challenged the statute, alleging that it gave extraterritorial effect to
Wisconsin law by penalizing the out-of-state soldier who voted illegally.67 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the state's sovereign power.68 The court grounded its holding in
international law principles recognizing a sovereign nation's extraterritorial authority to punish the criminal acts of its citizens in another state.6 9
Interestingly, the drafters of the commentary to a preliminary version of
the Model Penal Code quoted the Chandler court's analysis concerning
the issue of a state's power to enact extraterritorial legislation and cited
to codified international law principles of criminal jurisdiction.70
The drafters' reliance on principles of international law coincides with
their stated intention for section 103(1)(f): to increase a state's ability to
protect its interest, because international law theories of criminal jurisdiction recognize more jurisdictional options than simply the territoriality principle.7" This reliance raises questions concerning the type of
criminal jurisdiction principles recognized in international law,72 and the
applicability of these principles to the separate states of the United
States.
B.

ExtraterritorialLegislation and InternationalLaw

International law recognizes five bases of jurisdiction for criminal legislation. 73 Although states rarely extend their jurisdiction based on all
67. Id. at 400. The candidate argued that the penal clause of the voting act violated the Constitution because the Constitution secures a right to a speedy trial in the district where the offense
occurs. Id. at 404. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The candidate claimed that this requirement barred
convictions under the penal clause of the law. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 400.
68. Id. at 420.
69. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court derived authority for the state's extraterritorial law
from international law's nationality principle of criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 419. See infra notes 8285 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nationality principle. The court did not consider
whether this principle applied to the separate states of the Union. However, the court found that the
Sixth Amendment did not bar the application of this theory. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 421-22.
70. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12 (citing Art. 5-7 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 519-561 (Supp. 1935)).
71. Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12.
72. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text for discussion of the five jurisdictional options
which international law recognizes.
73. Introduction to HarvardLaw School Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 435, 466 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention].
See also Francis Wharton, Extra-TerritorialCrime, 4 S. L. REV. 676 (1878); B. J. George, Jr.,
ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MicH. L. REV. 609 (1966); Rollin M. Perkins,
The TerritorialPrinciple in CriminalLaw, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 1155 (1971); Larry Kramer, Note,
Jurisdiction Over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. Cal. L. REV. 1431 (1983).
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five principles, a state may exercise all five principles or any one principle
alone in defining the scope of its jurisdiction.7 4
7
Territoriality constitutes the first basis for criminal jurisdiction. 1

Under this principle, a nation may proscribe particular conduct occurring within the territorial limits of the state. 76 Only the territorial bound-

aries of the state limit the sovereign's authority.77 Both English and
American common law adopted the territoriality principle.78

Second, international law universally recognizes the nationality principle as a basis of criminal jurisdiction. 79 This theory asserts that jurisdiction flows from the nationality of the person committing the offense.80 A

state has virtually unlimited power over its citizens, and a nation can
control its citizens' actions regardless of where the conduct occurs."1

This authority stems from the allegiance which the citizen owes to the
82
state.
The protected-interest principle, the third basis of criminal jurisdic-

tion, states that the national interest injured by the offense determines
jurisdiction.83 Therefore, a state can criminalize conduct beyond its bor74. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 446.
75. Id. at 445. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402(l)(a) (1987). See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
76. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 445; George, supra note 73, at 613.
77. Kramer, supra note 73, at 1441 ("The common law approach regards the interests of a
sovereign as circumscribed by its territorial limits and, as a corollary, as exclusive and absolute
within those limits.").
78. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
79. Art. 5-7 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 51961 (Supp. 1935).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 519-35 (discussing recognition of the nationality principle and its presence in legislation, treaties, resolutions and national penal codes).
82. Id. at 519. See also State ex rel Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398, 419 (explaining that the
nationality principle is "based upon the duty of allegiance"). In Chandler, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court also discussed the nationality principle in connection with punishing treason. 16 Wis. at 42021. Prosecution for treason generally rests on the nationality principle because treason constitutes a
violation of the allegiance owed to the state. The federal government recognizes the nationality
principle in its treason law. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988) states:
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of
treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not
less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988) (emphasis added).
But see George, supra note 73, at 613 (noting that treason falls within the protected-interest principle of jurisdiction).
83. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 445.
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ders that negatively impacts a state interest.8 4 To minimize this potentially expansive doctrine, international law only recognizes this theory
when the national interest affected by the out-of-state crime concerns
85
state security.
Fourth, a state may assert jurisdiction under the universality principle. 6 This theory provides that a state can prosecute criminals who
87
commit heinous crimes if the state can gain custody of the perpetrators.

The theory developed from nations' efforts to combat piracy on the high

seas."8 Yet, today, because terrorism constitutes the modern-day
equivalent to piracy, the universality principle allows any nation to convict terrorists, regardless of their nationality.8 9
Finally, under the passive-personality principle, the nationality of the
victim provides a basis for jurisdiction. 90 This doctrine grants a state
jurisdiction when a criminal commits an out-of-state crime against one of
the nation's citizens. 9 1 Although this corollary to the nationality principle has received wide acceptance, states often need not rely on it to obtain jurisdiction.9 2 Instead, to gain jurisdiction, states usually apply the

preceding four principles or the nationality-of-the-victim theory.93
84. Id. See also George, supra note 73, at 613-14.
85. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 543. The principle, incorporated into Article 7, "Protection-Security of the State," recognizes states' "competence to punish crimes committed abroad
against their security, integrity, or independence." 1d.
86. Id. at 445.
87. George, supra note 73, at 614; Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 563-72. The Draft
Convention incorporated the universality principle into Article 9, "Universality-Piracy," of the
draft. While the draft itself only granted states the power to reach piracy, nations extended the
universality principle to encompass other similar offenses. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 56972. Under the universality principle, some nations reach counterfeiting monies, the slave trade, and
narcotics trafficking. Id. at 570-71.
88. George, supra note 73, at 614; Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 563. The Constitution
expressly grants this power to Congress. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("To define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.").
89. Congress' recent efforts to stop terrorism resulted in the enactment of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. P.L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 896 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331-38 (Supp. 1992)). Although not expressly stated, the universality principle is inherent in
portions of the Act. See Brandon S. Chabner, Note, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Prescribingand Enforcing United StatesLaw Against Terrorist Violence Overseas,
37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 985, 998-1001 (1990).
90. George, supra note 73, at 614; Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 445.
91. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 445.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES TO THE STATES

International law constitutes an appropriate source of authority for extraterritorial state legislation. 94 A nation possesses two types of sovereignty: external and internal. 95 A nation's external sovereignty includes
the power to deal with other nations, participate in global affairs, and
impact activity beyond its borders. 96 Internal sovereignty consists of the
power a nation has over its internal affairs, such as its economy and other
domestic issues.97 International law does not address internal issues of
the government of that nation, 9 but instead, primarily focuses on conflicts between sovereign nations and matters of external sovereignty.99
Extraterritorial state legislation, by definition, constitutes an exercise of
external sovereignty: a state can affect conduct occurring outside its territorial boundaries. Thus, international law serves as a basis for a state's
authority to legislate extraterritorially. 1°
Although international law may provide an appropriate source of authority for extraterritorial legislation, it does not empower individual
states to legislate beyond their borders. The precepts of international law
focus on conflicts between nations exercising their external sovereignty
and do not necessarily apply to the states. 101 For the principles of international law to apply to the separate states, the states must have the authority to exercise external sovereignty.102 Whether the states may
exercise such external sovereignty depends on the source of the national
94. Kramer, supra note 73, at 1447.
95. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-19 (1936) (distinguishing between
internal and external sovereignty of a nation). See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text for
discussion of the Curtiss-Wright decision. See also Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 467 (distinguishing between subjects of internal, or domestic law, and subjects of international law).
96. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (external sovereign powers include "Et]he powers to declare
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties").
97. Id. at 315.
98. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 467.
99. Kramer, supra note 73, at 1447 (international law weighs the "competing interests of several sovereign states").
100. Id. See also Wharton, supra note 73, at 682-98; George, supra note 73, at 613-17; Perkins,
supra note 73, at 1155-71. Each of these authors focuses on international law jurisdiction principles
when examining extraterritorial issues. Because they all seek to extend the jurisdictional reach of
state criminal laws, they do not question the propriety of turning to international law to resolve state
extraterritorial questions. This Note argues that previous commentators on extraterritorial issues
inadequately analyzed the applicability of international law to the states.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. See, eg., Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 467 (excluding the applicability of the draft
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government's external sovereignty. The historical debate over the source
of the nation's external powers divides into two primary schools of
thought: the Sutherland School and the Delegation School. 103 The Sutherland School asserts that the federal government's external sovereignty
vested in the states as a collective whole, not in individual states." In
contrast, proponents of the Delegation School believe that external sovereignty vested in the individual states, and that these states then delegated
external sovereign authority to the federal government."0
A.

The Sutherland School

In 1936, Justice Sutherland authored the Supreme Court's majority
opinion in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 106 Rather than criticizing the
actual decision, critics focused on Sutherland's interpretation of American history." 7 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court faced the issue of whether
Congress had unconstitutionally delegated authority to the President. 0
In 1934, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to
prohibit United States arms merchants from selling weapons to countries
at war in South America." °9 Acting on the authority of the joint resolution, the President issued an embargo on weapons sales to Bolivia and
Paraguay. 1 10 A grand jury indicted the defendants for selling arms in
violation of the Presidential proclamation. 11 The Court upheld the va11 2
lidity both of the joint resolution and of the President's proclamation.
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court embraced the theory that external sovereign powers vested in the states collectively by virtue of the Declaration
of Independence.II 3 Prior to the American Revolution, the colonies posconventions for criminal jurisdiction to states or other political subdivisions because the principles of
constitutional or internal law govern such subdivisions).
103. Designating these historical conclusions as "schools" is merely a convenient shorthand for
identification purposes.
104, See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
105. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
106. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
107. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Hon. James Quarles, The Federal Government: As to
Foreign Affairs, Are its Powers Inherentas DistinguishedFrom Delegated?, 32 GEo. L.J. 375 (1944).
108. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322.
109, Id. at 311-12.
110. Id.at 312-13.
IM1 ld. at 311.
112. Id. at 329.
113. Id.at 316.
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sessed no external sovereignty;114 it belonged to the Crown in England." 5 In declaring independence from England, the newly formed
states acted collectively. 116 Hence, external sovereignty vested in the
United States, not the states as separate and individual entities.1" 7 In
other words, the federal government received the power of external sovereignty directly from England. Because external sovereignty never resided in the states, they could not delegate external sovereignty to the

federal government.

8

Therefore, the states do not possess any residual

sovereignty.1 19

external
Sutherland's theory derived from the works of Justice Story, a member
of the Supreme Court during the nineteenth century.' 20 Shortly after
the Civil War, Justice Story advanced the position that before the American Revolution, the colonies were not independent sovereign states, from
an international law perspective. 2 ' He argued that the American people
constituted the true soyereigns. 122 External sovereignty, therefore,
23
vested in the federal government because it represented all the people.I
24
sovereignty.
external
no
As a result, the individual states possessed
Under Sutherland's view, because states do not possess external sover114. Id. Justice Sutherland did not support this premise with any specific historical data. See
id.at 317 n.1.
115. Id. at 316.
116. Id. Sutherland attached great significande to the fact that the states acted "through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress" rather than as independent sovereigns. Id. The
Continental Congress exercised all the classic elements of external sovereignty: "That agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of Independence." Id.
117. Id. "As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as a unit, the
powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America." Id.
118. Id. This is the most controversial aspect of Justice Sutherland's theory. Levitan, supra
note 107, at 495-97. Sutherland argued that even absent the affirmative powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution, the federal government would have external sovereign powers.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. This suggests that the national government has "extra[c]onstitutional" powers. Extra-constitutional power contradicts the basic American belief that the
Constitution established the division of powers between the states and the federal government. Levitan, supra note 107, at 490.
119. George, supra note 73, at 615-17.
120. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317 n.l.

121. 1 JOSEPH

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

147

(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873) ("[I]t is apparent that none of the colonies before the Revolution were ...independent or sovereign communities.").
122. Id. at 149.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 148 ("[Colonies] could make no treaty, declare no war, send no ambassadors, regu-
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eignty, 125 international law principles do not apply to the states. In fact,

the Research in International Law Draft Convention1 26 expressly refused
to extend membership in the community of nations to the separate
states.12 7 The Draft Convention stated that its codification of interna-

tional law does not apply to political subdivisions, such as the individual
American states. 128

Because the states have no external sovereignty

under the Sutherland School, they cannot derive authority from jurisdictional principles of international law to legislate extraterritorially.
B.

2 9

The Delegation School
After the Curtiss-Wright decision, commentators questioned Justice

Sutherland's historical interpretations and conclusions.1 30 In 1946,
David Levitan published an analysis of Justice Sutherland's theory which
interpreted the historical data of Colonial America and revealed wide-

spread evidence that states exercised external sovereignty.1 31 Levitan argued that during the period from 1783 to 1789, state constitutions, which

contained clauses empowering state officials to start war or make peace
1 32
only with the state legislature's consent, evidenced state sovereignty.

In addition, the commentator noted that because individual states engaged in treaty negotiations with foreign nations and borrowed money

the states themselves, and other nations,
directly from foreign countries,
1 33
perceived them as sovereigns.
Levitan convincingly demonstrated that states were independent, soylate no intercourse or commerce, nor in any other shape act, as sovereigns, in the negotiations usual
between independent states.").
Story and Sutherland's views have received some modern support. See, e.g., EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 202 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed.
1984) ("It must follow, then, that the Constitution, instead of being the immediate source of the
external powers of the national government, is only their mediate source, and confers them simply in
consequence of having established a nation truly sovereign in relation to other nations.").
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
127. Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 467. The Convention did suggest that the individual
states of the United States could possibly employ international law principles by analogy. Id.
128. Id.
129. George, supra note 73, at 616-17.
130. See supra note 107.
131. Levitan, supra note 107, at 478 n.85, 478-90.
132. Id. at 485. For example, the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 provided: "[T]he governor and commander in chief shall have no power to commence war, or conclude peace, or enter into
any final treaty without the consent of the senate and house of representatives." Id.
133. Id. at 485-87.
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ereign nations, exercising inherent powers of external sovereignty.' 3 4
States, therefore, possessed external sovereignty, and delegated a portion
of this sovereignty to the national government by approving the Constitution. 3 5 According to the Delegation School, states still possess all the
36
residual external sovereignty not delegated to the federal government.
Thus, because the states retained a degree of external sovereignty, the
states could still derive authority from international law to legislate
37
extraterritorially.1
Under the Delegation theory, two conditions attach to states' exercise
of external sovereignty. 138 First, states may exercise external sovereignty
only if the federal government does not occupy the field subjected to state
legislation.1 39 For example, states cannot negotiate treaties with foreign
134. Id. at 487. "In brief, state exercise of the external powers is to be seen throughout this
period." Id. The Court was referring to the time prior to the establishment of the Confederation in
1783.
135. Quarles, supra note 107, at 382. The drafters enumerated Congress' foreign relations powers in the Constitution. Article I, § 8 grants power to Congress:
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations... ;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Capture
on land and water;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to... repel Invasions;
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
136. George, supra note 73, at 617.
137. Id. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1910) (states are "competent to exert that
residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself").
138. George, supra note 73, at 617. George discussed three limitations on a state regulating
conduct beyond its borders: (1) the legislation cannot "conflict" with the federal government's plenary foreign relations power; (2) the legislation cannot attempt to regulate an area preempted by
Congress; and (3) the legislation cannot impinge on another state's legislative policies. Id. The first
category collapses into the second, leaving only two constraints: (1) the state cannot act if the federal government already occupies the field; and (2) the legislation cannot conflict with another state's
sovereignty. Id.
139. Id. The Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause doctrine is consistent with this constraint on states' extraterritorial legislative authority. For a discussion of the dormant commerce
clause, see generally Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in its First Century,
13 U. DAYTON L. Rav. 417 (1988). State regulation of interstate commerce constitutes an exercise
of external sovereignty because the state attempts to influence conduct beyond its borders. Under
the dormant commerce clause doctrine, states may regulate interstate commerce in the absence of
federal regulation, or where federal law does not preempt state law. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,
481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding a state statute regulating purchase of corporate securities). See Don-

1992]

EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF STATE ABORTION LAWS

1223

nations because the national government has plenary power over foreign
relations.""4 A second condition restraining a state's exercise of external
sovereignty stems from the nature of the federal union. States may only
exercise external sovereignty if the state does not impinge on the internal
1 41
sovereignty of another state.
IV.

CAN A STATE ENACT EXTRATERRITORIAL ABORTION
LEGISLATION?

A. A HypotheticalExtraterritorialCriminalAbortion Statute
As discussed above, the Casey decision will force courts across the
42
country to address the legality of state-restrictive abortion legislation. 1
Although Casey forbids a state from declaring abortion illegal, the
Court's holding does not prohibit states from enacting restrictive abortion legislation. 143 Several states have already enacted such legislation.'" Theoretically, a state opposed to abortion could enact a law
prohibiting its female citizens from traveling to another jurisdiction to
aid H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (I) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1865 (1987)
(discussing CTS Corp. from two perspectives: (1) as a validation of the dormant commerce clause
doctrine; and (2) as an example of extraterritorial state legislation). See also Martin H. Redish &
Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism,
1987 DUKE L.J. 569. The fact that the Delegation School's constraints on state exercise of extraterritorial power shadow similar restrictions on dormant commerce clause legislation lends support to
the former's test for the validity of state extraterritorial legislation.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Levitan, supra note 107, at 496
("[T]here is general agreement that the national government does possess complete authority as to
external affairs.").
141. George, supra note 73, at 617. George offered little guidance regarding what constitutes a
conflict with another state's legislative policies. In Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), the
United States Supreme Court suggested that an extraterritorial state statute impinges on the internal
sovereignty of another state when it conflicts with the rights of another state's citizens. Id. at 76-77.
In Skiriotes, a jury convicted Skiriotes for using diving equipment to gather sponges off the coast of
Florida in violation of a Florida statute. Id. at 69-70. The statute prohibited the use of diving
equipment for the purpose of collecting sponges. Id. at 70. Florida's marine boundary was nine
nautical miles from the coast. Id. The United States' boundary was three nautical miles from the
coast. Id. Skiriotes challenged the statute on the grounds that Florida's criminal jurisdiction could
not extend beyond America's boundary. Id. The Court upheld the statute because it neither conflicted with a congressional statute or policy nor with the rights of citizens of another state. Id. at
76.
142. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
143. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992).
144. Louisiana, for example, recently passed a resolution reaffirming the state's restrictive abortion laws and expressing its intent to assert those laws if the Supreme Court overturns Roe. The
Louisiana resolution states:
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obtain a legal abortion. For the purpose of this discussion, assume that
one state, Alpha, has outlawed abortions except in the case of rape, incest, or for minors who obtain either parental consent or a judicial bypass. 145 At least one other state, Beta, permits legal abortions for all
women, including minors without a consent requirement. Further assume that Alpha has enacted the following criminal abortion statute.
A woman may be convicted under the laws of this State for obtaining an
abortion beyond the territorial boundaries of this State. Abortion is viewed
as taking the life of an unborn human being and this State asserts an interest in protecting all human life, except in the case of rape, incest, or for
minors with the proper consent. Aborting an unborn human being that is
being carried to term by a woman citizen of this State is an injury to this
State's expressed interest. A woman violating
this provision shall be sen14 6
tenced to no more than five years in jail.
B. Applicable InternationalLaw Principles
The hypothetical criminal abortion statute constitutes extraterritorial
legislation by attempting to prohibit conduct considered legal outside the
state boundaries.14 7 An applicable international law principle must authorize jurisdiction for this type of statute.1 4 1 Only one out of the five
international law criminal jurisdiction principles allows a state to enact
extraterritorial abortion legislation.
The nationality principle allows a state to proscribe certain out-of-state
WHEREAS, Louisiana's criminal abortion statutes,... remain a part of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950; and
WHEREAS, since the Roe v. Wade decision the Louisiana Legislature has passed a
number of statutes designed both to restrict abortion to the maximum extent permitted by
the United States Supreme Court and to protect the unborn as well as women, doctors, and
nurses who do not wish to participate in abortion; and
WHEREAS, the Louisiana Legislature has clearly stated its intent.., that Louisiana's
criminal statutes prohibiting abortion take priority over those statutes which only regulate
abortion and that abortion should be prohibited as soon as permitted by federal courts.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that it is the intent of the Legislature of Louisiana
that the district attorneys of this state shall enforce the criminal statutes pertaining to
abortion.., to the fullest extent permitted by and consistent with the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
House Concurrent Resolution No. 10 of 1989, reprintedin LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.0 (West
1991) (historical and statutory note).
145. In Casey, the Court found that these consent requirements did not unduly burden a woman's right to an abortion. 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
146. This hypothetical statute is modeled after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(l)(f). See supra
note 41 for the text of § 1.03(l)(O.
147. For purposes of this discussion, assume that other states protect a woman's right to have an
abortion and some states provide some degree of legalized abortion.
148. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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conduct for its own citizens because the citizen owes a duty of allegiance
to the state. 149 This principle legitimates the hypothetical statute because
adherence to the law furthers the state's purpose of protecting life.15
Thus, by adhering to the statute, the women citizens abide by their duty
1 51
of allegiance, which they purportedly owe to the state.
The universality theory does not authorize extraterritorial abortion
legislation. 52 The universality principle allows a state to punish out-ofstate conduct, but Congress has restricted its application to crimes which
threaten ordered liberty.' 53 Historically, piracy fell within the category
of heinous crimes which states could reach under the universality principle. 154 Because the hypothetical model assumes that some states permit
legal abortions, abortion cannot qualify as a universally recognized threat
to ordered liberty. Because abortion does not constitute a heinous crime,
the universality principle does not provide a state with the power to enact
extraterritorial abortion legislation.
Similar to the universality principle, states should not rely on the protected-interest principle in order to enforce extraterritorial abortion legislation. Under this principle, a state may criminalize out-of-state conduct
if the conduct negatively impacts an interest of the state and threatens
state security.1 55 For example, states have employed the protected-interest principle to punish voter-fraud schemes.' 56 A voter-fraud scheme legitimately threatens the security of the state by rendering the state's very
means of governance illegitimate. In contrast, abortion does not endanger state security because aborting fetuses does not threaten the very
existence of the state.
Finally, the nationality-of-the-victim principle similarly does not apply
to extraterritorial abortion legislation. Under this theory, a state obtains
jurisdiction when a perpetrator commits an out-of-state crime against a
149. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. This principle applies both to the federal
government and to state governments. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 355-56 (1908) (recognizing that some national interest will support extraterritorial jurisdiction);
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-99 (1922) (recognizing the applicability of the nationality
principle to a class of criminal offenses); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-75 (1940) (applying the
nationality principle to state legislation). For a discussion of Skiriotes, see supra note 141.
150. See supra text accompanying note 140.
151. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 88.
155. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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citizen of the state.15 7 In the hypothetical statute, the state is the victim
of the crime. 5 However, the nationality-of-the-victim principle only
contemplates redressing crimes against the state's citizens.1 59
Thus, the preceding analysis demonstrates that only the nationality
principle expressly authorizes the hypothetically proposed extraterrito-

rial abortion legislation. Even with the nationality principle, a state must
overcome significant hurdles. Specifically, before a state may utilize the
nationality theory, it must possess some degree of external sovereignty.
C. Restrictionson ExternalSovereignty
L

The Sutherland School

According to the Sutherland School, states do not possess any external

sovereignty, 1" because all external sovereignty was vested in the national
government when the colonies declared independence.1 61 Therefore,
states cannot rely on any principle of international law to authorize ex-

traterritorial legislation.

62

Under this theory, the hypothetical abortion

157. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
158. A state conceivably could assert jurisdiction under the nationality-of-the-victim principle
on the basis of the injury to the fetus. For the states to have this ability, the Supreme Court, in
overturning Roe, would have to declare that fetuses constitute "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, in overruling Roe, the Court will probably decline to take this path. Declaring fetuses "persons" would present a host of other problems, ranging from altering the legal age
for driving, voting, and drinking alcohol to cruel and unusual punishment challenges from pregnant
incarcerated women. Most recently, in Casey, the Court declined to declare fetuses persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the joint opinion referred to fetuses as "potential life." Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2817. Although the constitutional safeguards afforded a "potential life" are ambiguous,
the Constitution clearly offers more protection to a "person" than to a "potential life."
159. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 113.
162. Following the logic of the Sutherland School, a state could never legislate extraterritorially.
States must possess some residual external sovereignty to have the authority to enact extraterritorial
state legislation. Sutherland's theory denies that states ever possessed any external sovereignty. See
supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text. This position is untenable, however, given the weight of
authority supporting a state's ability to regulate conduct occurring outside its boundaries, at least in
some circumstances. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (recognizing that states can employ
the nationality principle).
The Sutherland School's absolute ban on extraterritorial state legislation is not only untenable but
perhaps even undesirable. Circumstances exist when a state should have the power to protect its
interests and the interests of its citizens. Voter-fraud schemes aimed at disrupting a state's internal
functioning constitute one circumstance under which a state requires the power to protect its inter-ests. See, e.g., State ex rel Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 388 (1863). States should be empowered to
protect the very existence of the state. Because the Sutherland School's result precludes a middle
ground position, its practical importance is quite limited.
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statute does not withstand constitutional scrutiny because the state exceeded its authority in enacting the statute.
2.

The Delegation School

In contrast to the Sutherland School, the Delegation School holds that
states retain some residual external sovereignty not delegated to the national government by the Constitution.16 3 Under this theory, states can
legislate extraterritorially, if two conditions exist. First, the national government cannot occupy the field subject to the legislation by either possessing plenary power over, or by having legislated in, a given area.
The hypothetical statute assumes that the national government returned
the abortion issue to the states. The first condition, thus, does not bar the
state from enacting extraterritorial abortion legislation.
Second, the state's extraterritorial statute cannot infringe on another
state's internal sovereignty.1 65 State Alpha's proposed abortion statute
seeks only to punish a woman upon her return to the state. The statute
does not attempt to punish State Beta's citizens for engaging in conduct
that is legal in Beta. These facts, however, do not save this statute from
impinging on Beta's sovereignty. The law existing in Beta allows its citizens to obtain and perform abortions. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires all other states to respect and honor the "acts" of Beta. t 66 By
enacting an extraterritorial restrictive abortion statute, Alpha is attempting to regulate the actions of Beta's citizens. It is doubtful that a doctor
in the state of Beta would perform an abortion on a woman in the state
of Alpha knowing that his action may subject his patient to a possible jail
sentence. Alpha's extraterritorial abortion statute undermines Beta's
abortion policy and infringes on a Beta citizen's right to practice a proFaith and Credit
fession. Thus, Alpha's abortion statute violates the Full
1 67
powers.
sovereign
internal
Beta's
impedes
and
Clause
163. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943)
("The full faith and credit clause, like the commerce clause, thus became a nationally unifying force.
It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the other,
by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part
are given nation-wide application."); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942).
167. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 82728 (1974) (striking down a Virginia statute which prohibited a Virginia citizen or publication from
advertising about legal abortion in New York).
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According to the tenets of the Delegation School, a state does not have

sufficient residual external sovereignty to employ the nationality principle to authorize the state's extraterritorial abortion legislation. The pro-

posed legislation would effectively interfere with another state's internal
sovereignty; thus, the Constitution would render the statute invalid.
V.

CONCLUSION

A state would exceed the limits of its sovereignty if it attempted to
punish citizens who obtained abortions in other states. However, as the
preceding analysis suggests, extraterritorial state legislation is clearly permissible under some circumstances. Hence, the Model Penal Code drafters' presumption that, depending on the circumstances, extraterritorial
state legislation law can constitute either a constitutional or an unconstitutional exercise of state power is correct. 168 Because extraterritorial
abortion legislation is on the horizon,16 9 future courts and legislatures
need a more comprehensive framework, such as the one detailed in this
Note, in order to adequately address extraterritorial state legislation
questions and propose acceptable constraints on state external
sovereignty. 170

Andrew J Ries

168. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
169. The issue of extraterritorial state legislation is also implicated when discussing the legality
of "Right-to-Die" and the surrogate-parenting statutes. See In re Busalacchi, No. 59582 (Mo. App.
Mar. 5, 1991) (discussing a father's desire to move his incapacitated daughter to a state permitting
removal of feeding tubes). See also Susan F. Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of
Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 399, 444-452 (discussing extraterritorial criminal sanctions and
surrogacy).
170. Most commentators cited in this work assert that a state needs greater ability to protect its
interests. From this vantage point, moving beyond the territoriality principle is beneficial. States
require the ability to protect themselves from harmful conduct aimed at the state from beyond its
borders. Yet, this power should be limited. A state's extraterritorial needs are reduced significantly
when the state attempts to invade the private lives or personal autonomy of its citizens. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (arguing that increased state
sovereignty has negatively affected civil rights and reduced constitutional guarantees).,
In addition, a state statute similar to the hypothetical abortion statute punishes individuals for a
status or physical condition. In this ease, the statute punishes pregnant women. In Robinson v.
California, the Supreme Court held that criminalizing status constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Interestingly, the Model
Penal Code drafters proposed § 1.03 prior to the Robinson decision. The drafters did not consider
the possibility that future courts could view § 1.03(l)(f) as a criminalization of status or physical
condition. See Draft, supra note 41, § 1.03 cmt., at 12.

